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This addresses the current configuration of surface naval 
vessels for employment in the information domain. It will 
address how surface assets such as the Aegis Guided Missile 
Cruiser (CG) and Destroyer (DDG) fit into the modern era of 
naval information dominance.  
An evaluation of past experiences and current 
technology will be used to recommend how to employ current 
surface assets information operations (IO) capabilities 
This thesis will also include an evaluation of current 
topics regarding information dominance and the cyber 
domain, focusing on the areas of electronic warfare, cyber 
warfare, and military information support operations 
(MISO). 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Although the Navy’s increased emphasis is on 
information dominance (ID) there is little to no 
documentation that matches Navy assets to ID rhetoric. 
Without guidance how will commanders understand how they 
may use ships to carry out the information dominance and 
information operations missions they may be tasked to 
accomplish? How does the Navy maximize the war-fighting 
effects associated with shipboard systems, through the 
information and physical domains, to optimize access of 
friendly forces to the information domain, while degrading 
or denying access to the enemy? These are the types of 
questions that need to be considered when developing a 
strategy for employing ships to achieve information 
dominance. 
The Navy views information itself as a vital asset to 
mission accomplishment, but it does not clearly define how 
it will use its ships within the realm of information 
dominance and while conducting operations in cyberspace. 
U.S. Navy ships such as the Aegis guided missile cruisers 
(CG) and destroyers (DDG) provide highly mobile platforms 
capable of carrying out multiple missions within and in 
support of the realm of information dominance.  
There is no consolidated go-to document that lists how 
planners can effectively use naval surface ships, such as a 
cruiser or destroyer, in information dominance and 
cyberspace operations. Doctrine may list how to conduct 
operations but it does not specifically list how to employ 
the multiple capabilities of individual platforms. 
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Capabilities lists that may be of use to planners would 
include non-kinetic fires capabilities and which platforms 
have the ability to provide measures of effectiveness once 
those capabilities are used. These measures of 
effectiveness could measure the correlation between the 
level of integration of non-kinetic fires within a mission, 
to support the effectiveness of kinetic fires, to the 
success of that mission. Lost in the discussion of the 
“what” of information dominance is the “how” to accomplish 
it; the “how” comes through the execution of information 
operations. 
Information operations account for all aspects of 
military operations in the information domain. Information 
dominance may be viewed as the goal of information 
operations. Just as the Navy conducts air operations and 
anti-air warfare as measures to achieve air superiority, it 
learns how to conduct information operations in order to 
achieve information dominance. Information operations are 
what the Navy does to achieve a state or condition of 
information dominance. The mission of information 
operations in support of information dominance is to 
successfully conduct information operations and control the 
information domain (US Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
2012). Ships are one tool that the Navy has to conduct 
information operations in support of information dominance. 
The current configuration of surface naval vessels 
will be discussed; including the manner in which surface 
ships such as the Aegis guided missile cruiser (CG) and 
destroyer (DDG) fit into the modern era of naval 
information operations to achieve information dominance. 
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The advantage of using ships within an overall campaign or 
battle plan will be explored as well as what these 
platform’s capabilities have to offer to IO planners. 
To achieve this, an evaluation of past experiences and 
current technology will be used to recommend implementation 
of current surface ship information operations (IO) 
capabilities as well as an evaluation of information 
dominance and the domain of cyberspace, focusing on the 
areas of electronic warfare, cyber warfare, and military 
information support operations (MISO). 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
To what extent, if any, can current naval surface 
ships become an effective tool for achieving information 
dominance and for operating within the cyber domain? 
In conducting this analysis, this thesis will address 
the following questions: 
 How do Navy ships use the elements of information 
operations to achieve the Navy’s mission of 
achieving and maintaining information dominance? 
 What do surface combatants bring to this fight 
that cannot be executed remotely from CONUS, that 
is, as things become more and more Internet 
Protocol (IP) Centric. 
 How do Navy surface combatants fit into Computer 
Network Operations (CNO)? 
 What does the changing world of EW look like in a 
Task Force environment? 
 How do we ensure that what information really 
matters gets to the decision makers regarding 
Information Dominance, so the question of “so 
what” is answered regarding capabilities? 
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B. DISCUSSION  
Information Dominance is the Navy’s initiative to 
maintain the Competitive Advantage in the 
Information Age. 
—ADM Gary Roughhead, CNO 
The Chief of Naval Operations vision and guiding 
principles regarding information dominance is to pioneer, 
field and employ game-changing capabilities, ensuring 
information dominance over adversaries and decision 
superiority for commanders, operational forces and the 
nation as a whole. The first set of principles includes, 
but is not limited to:  
 Utilizing every platform as a sensor 
 Ensuring every sensor is networked 
 One operator controlling multiple platforms 
 An increasingly sea-based unmanned air systems 
capability 
 A commonality in interfaces, data-links, and 
control systems 
 Every shooter having the capability of using 
target data derived from any sensor (Dorsett, 
2010).  
These principles can be applied to Navy ships and the 
way they operate: Ships are a platform of sensors designed 
to network with other ships and forces, sharing targeting 
data as well as information for basic situational 
awareness. This information is provided through common/ 
compatible tactical data links. Ships are also organized 
into battle groups where each warfare area is centralized 
under warfare commanders.  
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Traditionally, the Navy has operated within a 
platform-centric view of warfare where emphases of effects 
and planning are based on individual independent platforms 
where the sensor, shooter, and decision maker were all from 
the same unit or platform (Dunn, Powell, Martin, Hamilton, 
& Pangle, 2004). In a platform-centric environment, ship 
captains would operate as autonomous units, not necessarily 
communicating with other units to complete their mission. 
With the drive to adapt the Navy’s strategy to a more 
networked approach, the Navy’s approach to information 
dominance includes initiative to move from platform-centric 
to information, or network-centric processes that would 
help create a fully integrated intelligence, command and 
control (C2), and cyber/networks capability. With the 
current configuration of modern warships providing 
satellite communications and common tactical data-link 
architecture, this networking of resources and information 
processing capabilities is what is necessary to be 
successful in a modern warfare environment. A fully 
integrated information operations capability, once fully 
realized, may prove to be the most valuable weapon against 
the adversaries of the United States (Dorsett, 2010).  
The Navy has shown its commitment to fulfilling its 
goal of information dominance through: 
 The establishment of the Information Dominance 
Corps (IDC) and manning that corps through 
recruitment and training programs designed to 
pull from current fleet assets/personnel 
 The development of new personnel qualification 
standards (PQS) and the new Information Dominance 
Warfare Pin 
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 The establishment of cyber warfare centers at the 
USNA and NPS 
 The establishment of an NROTC cyber scholarship 
program.  
The most visible commitment to information dominance 
was the establishment of the new Tenth Fleet (C10F)/Fleet 
Cyber Command. The establishment of this new command has 
elevated information to a core naval war-fighting mode and 
capability set (Dorsett, 2010). This new core of 
information professionals needs to integrate with current 
navy units and establish training for the fleet as a whole 
regarding the power of information and information 
dominance. 
This evaluation will suggest how surface assets, such 
as CGs, DDGs, and amphibious ships should be used as 
information operations assets. Suggestions will be made on 
how to incorporate and adapt current surface ship 
capabilities for use in the fast paced realm of information 
dominance. Navy information dominance strategy needs to 
incorporate the surface fleet and provide training to IO 
planners to ensure they understand how to effectively 
incorporate surface ships as tools within information 
operations. 
C. BENEFIT OF THE STUDY  
This study will provide individual ship commanders and 
crew, IO planners, as well as fleet leadership a better 
understanding of how information influences and is used to 




will explore the way surface ships such as cruisers and 
destroyers are used as assets to help achieve the goal of 
information dominance. 
The limitation of this study is that it will be 
limited to unclassified information and will not describe 
surface ship capabilities that are classified. 
D. ROADMAP OF THESIS: A CHAPTER OUTLINE  
This thesis is organized into six chapters: Chapter I 
provides an introduction to include areas of research, 
benefits of this study, and a roadmap to this paper. 
Chapter II provides a background of information operations 
and the concept of information dominance, globalization 
impacts, and electronic warfare. 
Chapter III lists current configuration of U.S. 
surface ships for C4I/ISR and EW as well as an emphases on 
the specific systems involved. The AN/SLQ-32, AEGIS, LRAD, 
and future programs are included. 
Chapter IV discusses information dominance, what ship 
capabilities help support information operations, and the 
vulnerabilities of an increased reliance on IP-based 
technology.  
Chapter V is the conclusion of this thesis. It 








The industrial age of the 1700–1900s has given way to 
the current information age. Leaders of modern militaries 
comment about a revolution in military affairs, where 
attacking information systems, as well as protecting one’s 
own system(s), will play a substantial part in conflicts of 
the future (Poisel, 2002). From this is born military 
information operations (IO), previously referred to as 
command and control warfare (C2W), where protecting and 
attacking information and the systems, or system of 
systems, that process it, comes into play (Poisel, 2002). 
This way of understanding IO is outdated and focuses more 
on an impediment to achieving information dominance; it 
focuses on technology and our Navy’s reliance on it with 
little emphasis on learning the nature of the information 
itself and its impact on human behavior. There needs to be 
a balance between the physical technology driven side and 
the information centric side of IO. Terms such as 
information-centric warfare and decision superiority have 
little meaning to ship commanders trying to complete IO 
missions without first understanding information’s role in 
the decision making process. 
B. WHAT IS INFORMATION 
Information: “the communication or reception of 
knowledge or intelligence; knowledge obtained from 
investigation, study, or instruction” (Merriam-Webster, 
2013).  
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Information Superiority: “The operational advantage 
derived from the ability to collect, process, and 
disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while 
exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same 
(Department of Defense, 2012).” 
Information Environment: “The aggregate of individuals, 
organizations, and systems that collect, process, 
disseminate, or act on information (US Office of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, 2012).” 
Within the realm of information operations a 
commander’s actions are based on a decision and that 
decision is based on information. Information is what 
ultimately drives behavior. Information is used to help 
explain reality, to help a ship’s commander know, to the 
best extent possible, all possible events or scenarios that 
may take place, based on his current situation, and through 
how the current environment is perceived. The way a 
commander perceives his environment is affected by past 
life and professional experiences, by the accuracy of 
information gathering and processing capabilities, and by 
what is currently happening, i.e., the commander’s 
momentary situation (Lippmann, 1943). The process of human 
decision making is what information operations is all 
about, regardless of the technology used to gather 
information or in the execution of information operations. 
No one can ever truly understand, know, or comprehend 
everything that is occurring within one’s current 
environment. At sea, a ship’s commander is only truly aware 
of the immediate surroundings, like the status of visual 
contacts, weather, and sea state; the rest of its 
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information environment is taken from links to other ships 
and information taken in by the ship’s sensors and is 
accepted to be true based on past experience. The best a 
commander can do is make an educated guess based on 
personal evaluation of the information at hand (see Figure 
1). This perceived or pseudo-environment is the environment 
upon which a commander is basing decisions; the actions 
taken within this pseudo-environment will have effects in 
the real environment (Lippmann, 1943). A commander’s 
ability to assess the effect of his actions and whether 
they fit into his perception of reality is one way in which 
he can gauge how accurate the command’s information 
processing capabilities are. The closer the expected 
outcome from a decision/action is reflected in the actual 
outcome may be a way to measure the effectiveness of the 
information used to formulate that decision.   
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Figure 1.  Goals of information superiority  
(From U.S. Army FM 3–0 ch 11, 2013) 
The Navy exists within an information environment that 
affects the cognitive, physical, and information dimensions 
(Figure 2) of the commanders that lead it. (US Office of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2012). Information permeates all 
aspects of operations through television, radio-
communications, instructions from throughout the chain of 
command, and the Internet. The concept of information has 
an impact on every aspect of our everyday lives, and 
information can be the deciding factor of whether or not a 
commander is successful, or fails, at accomplishing his 
mission (Floridi, 2010). How commanders learn and make 
decisions is based on the information fed to them by their 




Figure 2.  The information environment  
(From JP 3–13,2012) 
Information operations, as applied in a military 
setting, is comprised of five pillars: (1) computer network 
operations (CNO), (2) Military information support 
operations (MISO) (formerly known as Psychological 
operations), (3) military deception (MILDEC), (4) 
operational security (OPSEC), and (5) electronic warfare 
(EW) collectively known as information related capabilities 
(IRCs). These pillars, in concert with other lines of 
operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the 
decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries 
while protecting our own (US Office of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2012). These aspects of information operations may 













be applied to the capabilities and daily activities 
conducted in shipboard operations. 
Computer network operations are comprised of computer 
network attack, computer network defense, and all other 
operations related to the enabling of computer network 
exploitation (U.S. Army War College, 2011). The use of 
computers to communicate to entities outside the physical 
boundaries of the ship, as well as onboard ships has 
increased the ability of sailors, and those outside of the 
Navy, to access information and to possibly disseminate 
information outside of the lifelines of the ship. This 
makes information more vulnerable, by creating another 
channel that may be exploited by the enemy, increasing the 
need to put into place measures to protect it and to 
prevent opportunities where information may be exploited. 
In Joint Doctrine, Joint Publication 3–13.2, Military 
Information Support Operations (MISO) are defined as 
planned operations to convey selected information and 
indicators to foreign audiences to influence their 
emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the 
behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and 
individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s 
objectives (US Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011). 
Surface ships can support these operations by providing 
equipment to support pamphlet drops, the man power to help 
build schools during stability operations, and working with 
public affairs directorates to help boost strategic 
communications efforts to garner favorable sentiments 
toward the U.S. flag during ship port visits and community 
relations projects. 
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Deception involves actions that create the appearance 
of a situation that does not actually exist. It can be 
accomplished through the employment of decoy forces or 
radio and paper transmissions used to lead an adversary to 
false conclusions. An example of Military deception 
(MILDEC) operations during the first Gulf War was the 
movement of U.S. and coalition forces on the Saudi Arabia 
side of the Kuwait border that created the appearance of an 
attack against Saddam Hussein’s forces in Kuwait in the 
incorrect region (Poisel, 2002). Deception can also be used 
to convince an enemy that forces are smaller or larger than 
they actually are or to mask their true identity. During 
World War II the allies’ Navy was able to convince the 
Germans that the size of the allies’ force was much larger 
than it was (Breuer, 1993). 
“Loose Lips May Sink Ships” is a common phrase used to 
emphasize how important operational and information 
security are to shipboard operations. Operations security 
procedures are enacted onboard ships to help protect 
indications of upcoming operations. This can be through 
measures such as ensuring classified material is handled 
via proper methods and channels, and through taking care 
not to give away sensitive information through 
conversations and day-to-day interactions with others. The 
Navy stresses that OPSEC is every sailor’s responsibility 
and with the increased availability of computers onboard 
Navy ships this responsibility becomes more important.  
The largest area of information operations that is 
traditionally attributed to surface ships is Electronic 
Warfare (EW). Electronic warfare involves operations within 
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the electromagnetic (EM) environment and is waged to secure 
and maintain the freedom of action in the electromagnetic 
spectrum. EW includes three major areas: electronic attack 
(EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare 
support (ES). The purpose of EW is to deny the enemy an 
advantage within the EM spectrum while ensuring friendly 
unimpeded access to the EM spectrum portion of the 
information environment (US Office of the Joint Chief's of 
Staff, 2007). 
C. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
Command and control (C2) is the exercise of authority 
and direction by a purposely-designated commander over 
assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission 
(Coakley, 1992). In the Navy, C2 functions are performed 
through an arrangement of personnel, equipment such as 
ships and aircraft, communications (that may be visual, 
over radio, or through IP-based networks), and procedures 
employed by a commander in planning, directing, 
coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the 
accomplishment of the mission (Coakley, 1992). This 
definition treats C2 as a collection of command functions 
and those systems of people, procedures, and equipment that 
support command (Coakley, 1992). External communications 
and support systems facilitate the information exchange 
required to build and maintain an effective C2 system (Navy 
Warfare Development Command, 2011). Information and how it 
is relayed is the basis of any C2 system and this is 
reflected in the web-like nature of C2 networks (Coakley, 
1992). 
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The terms command and control can be used as both 
verbs and nouns. As verbs, they describe the process of 
what a commander does, and as nouns, they name a system. 
They are the arrangement of people, equipment (hardware and 
software), and the procedures that help commanders do what 
they do (Coakley, 1992). 
The procedures involved with a C2 system, like the 
actions that result from a commander’s decision cycle, have 
been derived from experience, common sense, the lessons of 
military history, and military theory. They constitute 
shared knowledge, the common thread that unites the minds 
of commanders from the top to the bottom of a chain of 
command. The procedures range from Service doctrines, which 
govern the use of weapons systems, to the principles of 
war, which guide commanders in their choices of strategies 
and tactics (Coakley, 1992). 
As part of a C2 system, Navy Commanders first receive 
orders, a mission, or a senior commander’s intent regarding 
a situation. They then attempt to gather as much 
information as they can about his environment to better 
facilitate situational awareness and to help develop or 
drive the decision making process to fulfill their task at 
hand (Coakley, 1992). Onboard Navy ships a thorough 
understanding of C2 resources is vital to watch-standers, 
especially the tactical action officer (TAO), situational 
awareness and watch-standing capability (Navy Warfare 
Development Command, 2011). 
An increasingly significant threat to effective 
command and control is warfare conducted in the cyber-
domain. The use of IO tactics to disrupt the C2 loop, 
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especially via the cyber-domain, can cause confusion 
regarding the authenticity of orders transmitted, and may 
give an adversary the ability to inject false information 
into the data-gathering process (Macke, 2013). Attacks can 
interrupt the connectivity between nodes and cause failure 
or delays of the C2 decision cycle. Understanding the 
vulnerabilities of C2 systems and ensuring that not all 
aspects of the decision chain are reliant on connections to 
the cyber-domain are two tasks vital to the success of 
information dominance (Macke, 2013). With C2 it is 
important not to put all of your eggs in one basket. 
Ensuring that C2 systems are capable of operating within 
and outside of a degraded or compromised cyber-domain is 
important to ensure reliable command and control. 
D. GLOBALIZATION 
The importance of a Navy rests on two pillars: its 
ability to affect events on land and its ability to control 
use of the sea, which includes the realm of commerce through 
seaborne trade. If the U.S. Navy wants to remain the 
dominant modern maritime force, it needs to recognize the 
impact globalization may have on these two pillars. 
Globalization as a phenomenon consists of substantial 
expansion of cross-border networks and flows; such flows may 
include the creation of global financial markets, expansion 
of democratic governance, or the increased ubiquity of the 
Internet and other forms of communications via modern 
information technology (Tangredi, 2002). Globalization 
illuminates the importance of evaluating the methods 
currently used to conduct information operations. Navy 
information professionals and planners need to ensure the 
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approaches used when carrying out information operations 
take into consideration the effects globalization has on 
information and an adversary’s capabilities. 
A likely effect of economic globalization is a 
continuing increase in the capability and proliferation of 
high-speed information systems and remote sensors. A 
particular concern to naval forces is the increased 
availability of commercial satellite imagery, communications, 
and navigation systems. GPS allows for accurate attacks and 
navigation and space-based communications are more difficult 
to jam (Tangredi, 2002). The ability to detect via space-
based systems may prove to be a vulnerability—could cause 
vulnerability of detection by space-based systems—but it is 
still unclear how capable adversary’s abilities will be to 
use this against the U.S. Navy (Tangredi, 2002). 
The world’s oceans are sometimes called “the great 
common,” open to all nations with the desire, access, and 
resources to master it. Oceans are the medium by which 90% 
(weight and volume) of world trade is transported and the 
medium by which the U.S. Navy has exerted its dominance 
(Tangredi, 2002). The increased reliance on modern 
technology requires the Navy to exert its dominance over 
the invisible cyber and information realm just as it does 
over the physical and visible maritime realm. The effects 
of globalization may require some collective self-
searching: even though most communication links seem to be 
over the air or Internet, the surface Navy and surface 
warfare remains the most reliable on-station assets to 
support or relay those links (Tangredi, 2002).  
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E. ELECTRONIC WARFARE 
The advent of the information age has brought about an 
almost universal reliance of society on wireless electronic 
communications. Even with the advent of software-defined 
radio, the reliance is still based on the RF spectrum. This 
reliance is shared by civilian businesses as well as the 
military. Cell phone systems are bringing these wireless 
communication systems to the mass public, but nowhere is 
this reliance on radio frequency (RF) technology more 
evident than in the military’s execution of command and 
control over its tactical forces (Poisel, 2004). Since use 
of RF communications is vital for tactical commanders to 
execute control over their forces, an adversary will have 
obvious interest in disrupting these communications, either 
through denial of use or through the interception of the 
information contained in them (Poisel, 2004). Electronic 
warfare is the name applied to actions taken to accomplish 
the intercept or denial of voice and data, including 
wireless, communications (US Office of the Joint Chief's of 
Staff, 2007). It is the need to prevent the enemy from 
disrupting our ability to freely and effectively use 
wireless communication channels that makes electronic 
warfare (EW) capabilities so important in the fight to 
achieve information dominance.  
The core, supporting, and related information 
operations capabilities all directly or indirectly benefit 
from EW. Principle EW activities have been developed to 
exploit the opportunities and vulnerabilities that are 
inherent in the physics of RF technology and EM energy. EM 
activities include, but are not limited to: electro-
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optical-infrared and radio frequency countermeasures; EM 
compatibility and deception; EM hardening, interference, 
intrusion, and jamming; electronic masking, probing, 
reconnaissance, and intelligence; electronic security; 
emission control; and spectrum management (US Office of the 
Joint Chief's of Staff, 2007). 
There are three major subdivisions within EW. They are 
Electronic Attack (EA), electronic Protection (EP), and 
Electronic Support (ES) and all three contribute to both 
offensive and defensive Information Operations capabilities 
(Naval War College, 2012). The outputs of all three areas 
of EW capabilities (EA, EP, and ES) impact the decisions of 
commander or tactical watch-standers. They rely on their 
ship’s EW capability to provide the information necessary 
to evade detection or attack by an adversary or to 
interrupt and degrade their adversary’s capabilities. 
Electronic attack is concerned with denying an 
adversary commander or unit access to the use of the 
electronic spectrum to effectively command and control 
their forces (US Office of the Joint Chief's of Staff, 
2007). EA involves actions taken to attack with the intent 
of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying an enemy’s combat 
capability. Electronic protection involves the ability to 
guarantee the use of the electromagnetic spectrum for 
command and control of friendly forces. EP actions may 
include self-protection jamming and emission control to 
minimize the effects of EW, either friendly or enemy, on 
friendly forces ability to use the EM spectrum. Electronic 
Support contributes to a commander’s ability to accurately 
estimate a situation in the operational area by detecting, 
 22
identifying, and locating sources of intentional or 
unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy to contribute 
to immediate threat recognition (Naval War College, 2012). 
Electronic Warfare is the most widely used element of 
information operations at the tactical level. EW tradeoffs 
are the relative benefits of EA versus ES for specific 
missions/operations. ES tells a commander a great deal 
about the location of an adversary and what they can see or 
jam, and when deciding to conduct an EA operation a 
commander must realize and plan for the ES information they 
may be giving up (Naval War College, 2012). 
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III. CONFIGURATION OF SURFACE SHIPS FOR IO 
A. INTRODUCTION 
When using a naval surface ship for information 
operations, what unique capabilities are available because 
of that ship’s presence? All surface ships’ assets 
capabilities are tied to the information domain, by the 
fact that they are involved in the collection, delivery, 
analysis, or modification of information, but not all are 
tied to the domain of cyberspace. A ship could be used as a 
persistent local presence for jamming, but its 
effectiveness depends on the ability for it to remain 
undetected and to provide enough signal strength to reach 
and disrupt the targeted signals. Another use than jamming 
or anti-jamming may be using the ship as a C2 platform to 
orchestrate and direct the actions of other more 
maneuverable air and surface assets- like small UAVs. 
Surface ship capabilities may also include non-kinetic 
fires and the ability to provide the integration of 
information to increase the effectiveness of kinetic fires.  
 24
 
Figure 3.  Example of shipboard satellite communications  
(From Surface Ship Operations, 2012)  
The proliferation of advanced military systems—such as 
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance sensors, as well 
as ballistic and cruise missiles parallels the post-Second 
Gulf War operational concept on how to defeat U.S. forces, 
known as anti-access, or area denial strategy. Instead of 
fighting U.S. naval forces on a regional battle space, 
future adversaries may attempt to prevent U.S. or coalition 
forces from reaching the battle space or they may attempt 
to engage first through the denial of information or 
through cyberspace. The goal of an anti-access strategy is 
to convince U.S., and coalition partners, that the cost of 
penetration is simply too high (Tangredi, 2002). If the 
Navy, including surface ship commanders, is able to 
maintain dominance of the cyberspace and information 
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domains it may be able to negate the effects of an 
adversary’s attempt at an anti-access strategy. 
When planning how to conduct an information operations 
mission to achieve information dominance a commander needs 
to determine what information he needs, what capabilities 
he has to achieve his mission’s goals, his information 
processing needs, and how he will measure the effectiveness 
of his actions. Table 1 lists some of the major 
capabilities of Navy surface platforms that help commanders 
make decisions through situational awareness and providing 
information of the battle-space in a way that may give his 
OODA loop/decision cycle an advantage over an adversaries’. 
B. CURRENT U.S. NAVAL SURFACE COMBATANTS IO CAPABILITIES 
1. Aegis 
Aegis is a computer-based networked command and 
decision combat system capable of simultaneous operations 
against multi-mission threats. The Aegis system was 
designed as a total detect-to-engage weapon system. At the 
heart of Aegis is the AN/SPY-1 series radar system, an 
advanced, automatic detect and track, multi-function 
phased-array radar. This high-powered radar performs 
search, track and missile guidance functions simultaneously 
with a track capacity of more than 100 targets. Aegis was 
designed to help warfighters compensate for the decrease in 
time available to make a decision and act during 
hostilities; it helps to speed up a commander’s OODA loop 
and decision cycle (Naval Sea Systems Command, 2012).  
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Figure 4.  AEGIS weapon system Mk 7 major elements,   
(From Naval Sea Systems Command, 2012)  
2. AN/SLQ-32 
With the capability of adversary platforms to carry 
and launch multiple anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) the 
need arose for an Electronic Warfare system aboard surface 
ships to meet this threat and the system developed was the 
AN/SLQ-32(V) whose external hardware can be seen attached 
to a U.S. warship in Figure 5 (Lewis, Elbourn, 
Schermerhorn, & Machleit, 1980).   
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Figure 5.  AN/SLQ-32 antenna (From Military  
Analysis Network, 1999) 
The primary mission of the AN/SLQ-32 is to defend own 
ship against the ASCM threat. To accomplish this, the 
AN/SLQ-32 provides detection, identification, and bearing 
of radar guided ASCMs and their associated threat 
platforms. The AN/SLQ-32 operator reads the information 
provided by the AN/SLQ-32 on a screen window display like 
the one pictured in Figure 6. The active electronic counter 
measures (AECM) subsystem of the SLQ-32 uses jamming, a 
form of electronic attack, and/or deception techniques, 
which alter specific or generic ASCM trajectories, to 
disrupt the targeting information an adversary requires for 





Figure 6.  View of the display window of an AN/SLQ -32  
(From Military Analysis Network, 1999) 
3. Long Range Acoustical Device (LRAD) 
Commanders have many long-range over the horizon 
sensors to help with their ability to acquire information, 
to affect enemy sensors, to help improve overall 
situational awareness, and to aid in decision-making. The 
Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) gives a ship’s commander 
the ability to affect the immediate area surrounding their 
unit in a non-kinetic way through the direction the LRAD is 
focused (Figure 7). LRAD is a portable device that provides 
clear and intelligible voice communications within 500 
meters of its placement (see Figure 8). The audio interface 
of a LRAD allows its operators to relay recordings to its 
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target audience in whichever language may be required. 
Missions supported by LRAD include: 
 Water-side force protection 
 Anti-piracy 
 Visit board search and seizure (VBSS) 
 MISO/ psychological operations (American 
Technology Corporation, 2004). 
 
Figure 7.  An example of LRAD operated onboard a naval  
vessel (From American Technology Corporation, 2004) 
LRAD lets pirates or aggressors know that the targeted 
vessel is aware of them, and helps defenders determine 
intent in deciding when to escalate force-protection 
measures (Lundquist, 2010). LRAD functionality can also be 
used as a tool in a commander’s non-lethal Electronic 
Attack capabilities by its ability to produce large amounts 




Figure 8.  How LRAD compares to other sound producing  
devices (From American Technology  
Corporation, 2004) 
4. Data LINKS/: GCCS-M, Link-11, and Link-16, CEC 
One of the largest contributions a surface ship 
provides to information operations is its ability to 
provide and maintain the common operating picture (COP). 
The COP is enhanced with information gathered by 
information systems such as radars and other sensors and 
then organized and distributed using systems such as GCCS-
M, Link-11, and Link-16 (Navy Warfare Development Command, 
2011). Figure 9 depicts what the common operating picture 
may look like involving a surface Navy combatant that is 
providing information to forces on the ground. 
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Figure 9.  An example of a surface ship aerial COP via  
a TDL network (From Ultra Electronica, 2011) 
Global Command and Control System- Maritime (GCCS-M) 
operates in a variety of environments in support of joint, 
coalition, and allied forces. It provides a single 
integrated and scalable C4I system that supplies 
information to aid Navy commanders, Tactical Action 
officers, and watch-standers when making tactical 
decisions. GCCS-M displays, at a near real-time capacity, 
the location of air, sea, and land units anywhere in the 
world and identifies them as friendly, enemy, or neutral 
units (Navy Warfare Development Command, 2011). Figure 10 
shows how the different components of the GCCS-M system are 
organized and how information flows to and from functional 
components and the units that provide inputs and outputs to 
the common operating picture. 
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Figure 10.  Global command and control system-maritime  
(GCCS-M) systems view, (From National Academies  
Press, 2013) 
Tactical data link, such as Link 11, Link 16, and 
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), interfaces provide 
a continuous exchange of information regarding friendly, 
hostile, and unidentified space, air, land, and subsurface 
tracks. They can provide the weapons status of friendly 
units as well as give their users to digitally transmit 
commands and requests to other commanders and units (Navy 
Warfare Development Command, 2011). Tactical data links 
provide a shared pool of information that can aid in 
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shortening a commander’s decision cycle and situational 
awareness, but they can also be susceptible to jamming and 
not all forms of tactical data links are universal amongst 
friendly or coalition forces (Navy Warfare Development 
Command, 2011). 
A commander can use the data gathered by GCCS-M in 
concert with data from other sources, such as Link-16, to 
construct relevant tactical pictures using maps, map 
overlays, imagery, oceanographic, or meteorological data. 
It provides a fusion plot of all tactical information 
relevant to the AOR. Supplied with information from GCCS-M 
and Link inputs, Navy commanders can review and evaluate 
the tactical situation, determine and plan actions and 
operations, direct forces, synchronize tactical operations, 
and integrate the maneuver of forces with firepower (Navy 
Warfare Development Command, 2011). 
5. Privateer 
Privateer is an EW support system found onboard 
Cyclone Class Patrol Coastal ships (PC). This support 
system helps extend the ability of commanders’ onboard PCs 
to contribute to the COP. It provides information to a 
commander to help make more informed decisions. It is 
comprised of two sub-systems capable of radar detection, 
identification, and location. Other capabilities of the 
Privateer system include: 
 System RF input management 
 General signal/spectrum search 
 Director search for specified signals in specific 
portions of the signal spectrum 
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Applications that allow tactical cryptologic support 
operators to type, record, and playback selected extracts 
of communications in order to support threat Indications 
and warnings (I&W) analysis (Navy Warfare Development 
Comand, 2007). 
6. Ship’s Signal Exploitation Space 
The Ship’s Signal Exploitation Space (SSES) provides 
indications and warning support to tactical watch standers 
and strike group planners. SSES can provide real-time 
reporting and dissemination of time-sensitive information 
to national and tactical-level decision makers throughout 
the region, fleet, and globe (USS George Washinton Public 
Affairs, 2012). 
7. Future Programs:  
a. SEWIP 
Goal 4 of the Navy Strategy for Achieving 
Information Dominance involves the continued development 
and research of systems to achieve integrated kinetic and 
non-kinetic fires. This goal states: 
To multiply war-fighting effects, the Navy will 
integrate kinetic and non-kinetic fires. To this 
end, the Navy will expand and strengthen its 
operations within cyberspace and the 
electromagnetic spectrum. To dominate in these 
areas, the Navy will further develop its cyber 
workforce, bolster related research and 
development, and refine its governance, policy, 
and TTP. Specifically, we must improve our active 
network defense and improve our cyber offensive 
capability. Likewise, the Navy must continue to 




adversary surveillance, targeting, and C2, and 
effectively counter anti-ship cruise missiles and 
ballistic missiles alike. (Department of the 
Navy, 2012)  
In military operations, once a new weapon is 
developed another will be invented to counteract the first 
one. This is no different when it comes to EW, ISR, and C4I 
systems. Detailed information on hostile radar and other 
information related systems is usually unavailable making 
it near to impossible to design an intercept receiver as 
effective as the original system or radar receiver (Tsui, 
2005). This makes the U.S. Navy’s continued research and 
development into future programs and system improvement 
programs important if it is to keep ahead of our 
adversaries’ capabilities.  
In an era that features more and more supersonic 
ship-killing missiles, with better radars and advanced 
electronics, SLQ-32′s fundamental electronic hardware 
architecture needs to be updated, and to accomplish this 
the Navy has initiated the Surface Electronic Warfare 
Improvement Program (SEWIP) (Defense Industry Daily, 2011). 
SEWIP is an ACAT II program designed to improve upon the 
current capabilities of the AN/SLQ-32 system and has been 
designed to release these improvements through block 
increments (Naval Sea Systems Command, 2012).  
Block Design: SEWIP is an evolutionary 
development block upgrade program for the AN/SLQ-32 EW 
system currently installed on aircraft carrier and surface 
and amphibious warships (CVN, CG, DDG, FFG, LSD, LPD, LHA, 
LHD, and LCC) in the U.S. Navy. In early 2012, a total 
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fleet-wide population of 150 systems was in operation. The 
SEWIP program is made up of four block upgrades: 
Block 1 provided enhanced Electronic Warfare (EW) 
capabilities to existing and new ship combat systems to 
improve anti-ship missile defense, counter targeting and 
counter surveillance capabilities. Block 1 is focused on 
processor enhancement, improvements in the human machine 
interface of the AN/SLQ-32, Block 1A, and added a Specific 
Emitter Identification (SEI) receiver, Blocks 1B1 and 1B2, 
and High Gain High Sense receiver (HGHS), Block 1B3. The 
SEI and HGHS capability provides improved battlefield 
situational awareness (Naval Sea Systems Command, 2012).  
Block 2 will provide an upgraded antenna, receiver 
and combat system interface for the AN/SLQ-32 system. 
Upgrades are necessary in order to keep pace with current 
threats and improve detection and accuracy capabilities of 
the AN/SLQ-32 (Naval Sea Systems Command, 2012).  
SEWIP Block 3 focuses on Electronic Attack (EA) 
capability improvements required for the AN/SLQ-32(V) 
system. SEWIP Block 3 will provide a common EA capability 
to all surface combatants that have been outfitted with  
the active variant of the AN/SLQ-32, as well as CVN-78 and 
CVN-79 new-construction platforms. This Acquisition will 
leverage technology developed under the Office of Naval 
Research’s (ONR) Integrated Topside Science and Technology 
effort (Naval Sea Systems Command, 2012). 
Block 4 will provide upgraded electro-optic and 
infrared capabilities to the AN/SLQ-32 system (Naval Sea 
Systems Command, 2012). 
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SEWIP was established as an ACAT II program in 
2002 after cancellation of Advanced Integrated Electronic 
Warfare System (AIEWS). Development of SEWIP Block 1A, 1B1 
and 1B2 are complete with upgrades in full rate production 
and Fleet-wide installations are in-progress. Development 
of SEWIP 1B3 is almost complete. The SEWIP Block 2 contract 
was awarded September 2009 and development is in progress. 
As of 24 October 2012, the SEWIP Block 3 program was still 
being established as the newest program/system able to 
support surface ships needs protect themselves from missile 
and other surface threats (Naval Sea Systems Command, 
2012).  
b. MQ-8B/C Fire Scout 
Embarked Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are one 
way a surface ship can extend its information gathering and 
dissemination capabilities beyond the sensors hardwired 
into the ship. The Northrop Grumman Corp MQ-8 Fire Scout is 
a rotary-craft UAV designed to be deployed on FFGs, 
littoral combat ships, and other surface combatants, and 
the UAV’s mission capabilities cover: 
 Reconnaissance, ISR 
 Situational awareness, including a night vision 
capability 
 Anti-piracy 
 Search and rescue 
 Precision targeting (SUAS News Staff, 2012). 
Payloads designed for the Fire Scout can include 
active and passive electronic warfare and electronic 
countermeasures equipment with an approximate eight hour on  
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station capability and a more than 100-mile range; jamming, 
communications relay, and satellite communications are also 
possible (Walsh, 2012). 
The MQ-8B Fire Scout has the ability to 
autonomously take off and land on any aviation-capable 
warship (figure 11) (Northrop Grumman, 2013). This UAV has 
been successfully tested onboard the frigate USS HALYBURTON 
were it completed a seven-month deployment alongside manned 
MH-60 Seahawks. During this deployment the Fire Scout 
demonstrated its ability to undertake missions involving 
anti-piracy and ISR (Donald, 2011).   Having a UAV asset 
like the MQ-8B Fire Scout gives a ship’s captain the 
ability to explore missions of longer duration or that are 
considered too dangerous for a manned helicopter or boat.  
 
Figure 11.  A Fire Scout prepares for the first  
autonomous landing aboard the USS Nashville (LPD 13) 
during sea trials in 2006 (From U.S. Navy, 2006). 
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In 2011, the Fire Scout successfully demonstrated the 
ability to send sensor data to the cockpit display of a MH-
60 helicopter in addition to home ship displays. Fire Scout 
compliments the Navy’s manned helicopters, which are vital 
ISR and ASW assets, by effectively expanding the range and 
area of ship-based intelligence gathering operations 
(Northrop Grumman, 2011). As development progresses with 
the Fire Scout program more ships may get the opportunity 
to test what a tactical unmanned aircraft offers to their 
common operating picture and decision making capabilities.  
Table 1.   Surface ship IO capabilities by platform 
 CVN CG DDG FFG PC MCM LCS LHA LHD LSD LPD
GCCS-M 
 X  X X  X  X     X   X  X   X 
LINK-11 
 X X  X  X         X X      
LINK-16 
 X  X X        X  X  X      
LRAD 
 X X  X   X X  X  X  X  X  X  X  
AN/SLQ-32 
 X  X X  X        X  X   X X  
SSES 
X   X X          X  X      
AEGIS 
  X  X                  
Privateer 
      X                
SEWIP 
(Planned) X  X  X  X        X  X  X  X  
Fire 
Scout 
(Planned) X X X X   X X X X X 
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IV. SURFACE SHIPS IN THE INFORMATION DOMAIN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Modern armed forces cannot conduct high-tempo, 
effective operations without reliable information 
and communication networks and assured access to 
space and cyberspace.   
—Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta 
As a result of recent cyber activity, including 
Stuxnet and Flame, many countries are preparing for cyber 
warfare (Stillions, 2012). The U.S. Navy has formed U.S. 
Tenth Fleet and Fleet Cyber Command to provide guidance and 
to show how dedicated the Navy is to ensuring dominance in 
the cyberspace domain. The Mission of U.S. Fleet Cyber 
Command: 
The mission of Fleet Cyber Command is to serve as 
central operational authority for networks, 
cryptologic/signals intelligence, information 
operations, cyber, electronic warfare, and space 
capabilities in support of forces afloat and 
ashore; to direct Navy cyberspace operations 
globally to deter and defeat aggression and to 
ensure freedom of action to achieve military 
objectives in and through cyberspace; to organize 
and direct Navy cryptologic operations worldwide 
and support information operations and space 
planning and operations, as directed; to execute 
cyber missions as directed; to direct, operate, 
maintain, secure, and defend the Navy’s portion 
of the Global Information Grid; to deliver 
integrated cyber, information operations, 
cryptologic, and space capabilities; to deliver a 
global Navy cyber common operational picture; to 
develop, coordinate, assess, and prioritize Navy 
cyber, cryptologic/signals intelligence, space, 
information operations, and electronic warfare 
requirements; to assess Navy cyber readiness; to 
manage man, train, and equip functions associated 
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with Navy Component Commander and Service 
Cryptologic Commander responsibilities; and to 
exercise administrative and operational control 
of assigned forces. (U.S. Fleet Cyber 
Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet, 2012)  
Through this mission statement U.S. Fleet Cyber 
Command has developed its vision to conduct full spectrum 
operations in and through cyberspace ensuring Navy and 
joint/coalition freedom of action while denying the same to 
our adversaries. The Navy intends to achieve this end 
through Global situational awareness and command and 
control, operational requirements generation, work force 
development, and partnerships with the intelligence 
community, industry, and academia (U.S. Fleet Cyber 
Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet, 2012). 
The mission of Tenth Fleet is to serve as the Numbered 
Fleet for Fleet Cyber Command and exercise operational 
control of assigned Naval forces; to coordinate with other 
naval, coalition and Joint Task Forces to execute the full 
three  spectrums of electronic warfare, information 
operations and signal intelligence capabilities and 
missions across the cyberspace, electromagnetic and space 
domains (U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet, 2012). 
Surface ships are able to support this mission through 
electronic warfare and information gathering and 
dissemination capabilities. Through military deception, 
information can be disseminated to influence adversaries 
causing them to believe in an information environment that 
does not reflect reality and causes them to act in a way 
beneficial to the U.S. and its allies.  
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Tenth Fleet’s mission to ensure freedom of action for 
the U.S. and her allies within the cyber domain can be 
compromised if ship commanders do not ensure their commands 
understand how their day to day activities affect the cyber 
domain. Surface warfare officers and enlisted sailors need 
to understand how personal connections over computer 
systems as well as the connectivity of the systems they 
operate in carrying out their duties may be connected to 
and affect security of operations in the cyber domain.  
B. IP-BASED ENVIRONMENT 
Modern ships exist and function in an Internet 
Protocol-based environment. The legacy model of voice or 
Morse code transmission via station-to-station has been 
replaced. Internet protocol or IP is the primary protocol 
that established the Internet. It is the principal 
communication protocol used for relaying packets of 
information across networks, called datagrams, as well as 
across network boundaries (Gehrke, 2012). IP defines an 
addressing system that functions to identify the hosts of 
the information as well as provides a location of that 
information, see Figure 11. Internet Protocol is vulnerable 
to attack and all Navy networks must be protected from 
adversaries who are rapidly gaining knowledge of IP 
weaknesses and exploits (Gehrke, 2012). Even with the 
proposed shift to the most current version of Internet 
protocol, IPv6, which is believed to be more secure, DoD 
IP-based systems and networks will still be vulnerable to 
Man-in-the-middle attacks, unauthorized access, as well as 
attacks on the physical/data-link layers of a system 
(Gehrke, 2012). 
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Ship’s data, through systems such as Global Command 
and Control System—Maritime (GCCS-M) and tactical data 
links, is exchanged via external communications channels, 
IP-based local area networks, and direct interfaces with 
other systems and networks (Navy Warfare Development 
Command, 2011). These systems are vital to a naval 
commander’s ability to make effective decisions. They are 
examples why a ship’s ability to conduct successful 
computer network operations (CNO) and EP measures is vital 
to mission success; failing to ensure access to required 
information via such systems would greatly hinder decision-
making. 
 
Figure 12.  What does an IP address lead to  
(After Oxford, 2010)? 
Decisions Made 
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C. WHAT DO SHIPS BRING TO THE FIGHT? 
Ships may not provide anything more to information 
operations or the fight to dominate cyberspace than 
intensified protections of their own systems and those 
systems to which they are connected, including embarked UAS 
platforms like the Fire Scout that expand the reach of  
ships sensors. However, protecting own ship’s systems, 
connectivity, and information operations capabilities is an 
essential mission of a ship commander and requires focused 
effort and attention. The commander needs to understand 
this, but also needs to understand that the information 
gathering, dissemination, EW, and MISO capabilities of a 
ship are also vital information operations tools in the 
overall quest for information dominance by the force as a 
whole. 
The mission of the U.S. Navy is to maintain, train, 
and equip combat ready naval forces capable of winning 
wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the 
seas (Department of The Navy, 2013). To fulfill this 
mission, an individual ship may serve in a direct or 
indirect role in support of achieving and maintaining 
information dominance. The capabilities of surface ships 
lend them to be information gathering platforms, electronic 
warfare platforms, and command and control platforms based 
on their tactical data link and communications 
capabilities. 
The surface fleet provides a distributed, far field of 
sensors that can be netted together to fill gaps and holes 
in the world-wide intelligence picture; ships are 
persistent on station and have the acreage that other units 
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do not, their sheer tonnage and available space can be used 
in ways and with payloads smaller assets are unable to 
accommodate (K. Eyer, personal communication, December 12, 
2012). To share the results of information gathering, ships 
must remain securely connected to the information grid. 
1. Kinetic and Non-kinetic Fires 
The increased reliance of modern technology requires 
the Navy to exert its dominance over the invisible cyber 
and information realm just as it does over the physical and 
visible maritime realm. The popular slogan “putting 
warheads on foreheads” epitomizes the Navy culture of 
focusing on conducting kinetic fires, but this may not be 
the most efficient, effective, or appropriate way to engage 
adversaries in future conflicts. Surface ships most useful 
non-kinetic capability is its ability to conduct electronic 
warfare, and this contribution should be emphasized and 
exercised frequently. 
Non-kinetic energy (NKE) weapons are weapons that seek 
to achieve their purpose other than through the threat or 
application of force to physical objects such as buildings, 
weapons systems, or the human body (Casey-Maslen, 2010). A 
non EW example of a non-kinetic method for controlling a 
situation would be the use of LRAD during anti-piracy 
operations. The effects of the LRAD may discourage the 
pirates from their target without the ship that is 
defending themselves from them having to fire even warning 
shots. 
Non-kinetic fires enhance the ability to employ 
kinetic fires by removing the enemy’s ability to conceal 
himself through the use of information operations 
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(McConnell, 2005). Through military deception or jamming a 
Navy Commander can degrade an adversary’s ability to 
effectively engage and attack without physically destroying 
his capabilities. He or she can use deception to inject 
information into the information-environment to affect an 
opponent’s decision making capability. If a commander 
believes that a data link network has been compromised by 
an opponent a possible deception may be to add false 
contacts or resources into the common operating picture or 
mask how his own forces are displayed. UAS platforms could 
aid in this deception by mimicking a high value target. The 
cost of an enemy shooting down an unmanned target is much 
less than that of a manned aircraft. If an opponent is led 
to believe a target is in a false location he or she may 
waste their resources on that false target leaving the real 
target unharmed. 
The Navy’s information dominance vision is to provide 
assured maritime command and control and superior battle 
space awareness to enable sustained, integrated fires 
across the full spectrum of modern maritime warfare 
(Department of the Navy, 2012). To achieve this vision the 
Navy strategy is to integrate kinetic and non-kinetic 
courses of action to accomplish objectives. Through the use 
of UAVs, tactical data links, and electronic support ships 
are able to maintain a robust common operating picture for 
use by the C2 construct. To protect the validity of the 
information the COP presents to decision makers and to 
reduce vulnerability to adversary’s sensors ships are able 
to conduct electronic protection and CNO directed at 




The Navy’s strategy for information dominance states 
that the information war-fighting domain is cyberspace and 
the network and the electromagnetic spectrum comprise that 
battle-space (Commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. 
Tenth Fleet Public Affairs, 2012).”  To guide its future 
maneuvers within the information war-fighting domain the 
Navy has developed three documents, which will guide Navy 
Information Dominance and Cyber warriors into the future. 
They are the Navy Strategy for Achieving Information 
Dominance 2013–2017, Navy Cyber Power 2020, and the Navy 
Information Dominance Corps Human Capital Strategy 2012–
2017. Each document lays out a strategic plan that will 
ensure the U.S. Navy achieves information dominance by 
striving to maintain the operational advantage gained from 
fully integrating information functions, capabilities, and 
resources to optimize decision-making and war-fighting 
(Commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet 
Public Affairs, 2012). These are not documents for the 
Information Dominance Corps (IDC) alone. Unrestricted line 
officers, and surface warfare officers in particular, need 
to read and understand the ID vision in order to fully 
integrate and employ surface ships in the struggle for 
information dominance. 
These documents focus on the three fundamental 
information dominance capabilities of assured command and 
control, battle-space awareness, and integrated fires, and 
claim they set broad but achievable goals, including strong 
and secure U.S. Navy command and control and information 
dominance as a war-fighting discipline (Commander, U.S. 
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Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet Public Affairs, 2012). 
They do not however explain what exactly needs to be done, 
using current capabilities, to accomplish these fundamental 
information dominance capabilities. There is no clear 
definition describing what cyber means to the Navy and the 
Department of Defense as a whole. A definition describing 
what cyber is needs to be accepted. It is difficult to 
develop and explain strategy within a cyber-environment 
without this definition. The rhetoric that describes these 
capabilities needs to be backed up with training on which 
assets are best suited to support each goal and how ship 
commanders may fit into supporting the achievement of 
assured command and control, battle-space awareness and 
integrated fires. 
A simple definition for cyber is anything relating to 
or involving computers or computer networks, like the 
Internet or World Wide Web (Merrium-Webster, 1991). This 
definition lends itself to define the cyber-domain as the 
space where computer network operations take place. This 
newest of domains is difficult to constrain to modern rules 
of engagement and civil law due to the fact that there are 
no truly defined nation-state borders within the cyber-
domain. A strategy within this type of environment is 
easier to achieve if it first focuses on protecting one’s 
own assets before attempting to develop offensive 
capabilities.  
Surface ships can be integrated into the goals of 
assured command and control and battle-space awareness 
through the integration of their tactical data link and EW 
capabilities. Ships may be the only actual eyes and ears on 
 50
station to verify what a C2 center believes the situation 
to be, and this makes them vital to authenticating the 
information environment. Ships may also be used to back up 
these goals by ensuring they do not solely rely on the 
modern cyber related and IP-based computer networked 
technologies to run the C2 construct. Ways to train for 
this could include a reinvigoration of basic seamanship 
skills for signals to other ships and forcing a ship to 
function without the aid of computer chat functions and e-
mail. Another important training tool would be to teach 
ship operators the fundamentals of information, how it may 
manifest itself, and how it can affect the actions of 
decision makers. It is not good enough to simply know how 
to read a radar screen or COP. The user needs to 
fundamentally understand how those tools function and how 
the information picture they are using is developed and the 
possibility for errors. 
Ships need to be viewed as more than kinetic platforms 
waiting to put warheads on foreheads. The EW capabilities 
of a surface ship give it the ability to gather information 
on enemy forces, and deception capabilities provide the 
ability to inject false information into the information 
environment. Other MISO related functions could include 
providing print production capabilities to ally or special-
forces, and enabling them to accomplish missions by proving 
a base of operations more robust than the equipment they 
are able to carry into the environment. UAVs embarked 
onboard a ship may be capable of disseminating deceptive 
information or pamphlets in support of MISO operations. 
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Just as the role of surface ships evolved to adjust to 
changes in the technology and tactics of aircraft, 
submarines, and missiles—the role of surface ships must 
continue to adapt to changes in the technology and tactics 
of the cyber domain and the battle for information 
dominance. It requires the full attention of all 
stakeholders to find the best methods. The IDC must think 
about and understand ships and their capabilities just as 
shipboard experts must understand the impact of information 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Control of information-much of it through the 
electromagnetic spectrum—is already growing more 
important than the control of territory in modern 
warfare. 
-Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval 
Operations, 23 September 2011 
The DoD views information itself as a vital resource 
to mission accomplishment but does not clearly define how 
it will use all of the information operations tools 
available to achieve information dominance and while 
conducting operations in cyberspace. U.S. Navy assets such 
as the Aegis guided missile cruisers (CG) and destroyers 
(DDG) provide highly mobile platforms capable of carrying 
out multiple missions within and in support of the realm of 
information dominance and cyber warfare, if properly 
employed. They are able to carry out these missions only if 
those that command them understand the importance of what 
is at the heart of information dominance and cyber warfare; 
information itself and its ability to affect human behavior 
and influence decision making.  
It is information itself that is the foundation of all 
action. Any foundation for attaining information dominance 
has to be based in the understanding of information and its 
effect on behavior. 
Controlling the ability to access and process 
information and information systems faster and more 
effectively while denying an adversary is the goal of 
information dominance and serves several purposes. It can 
deny information availability to adversaries during 
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important junctures in his operations. It can be used 
deceptively to provide false information causing an 
adversary to reach an incorrect conclusion. It can also 
degrade the confidence of adversarial decision makers have 
in their information systems (Poisel, 2002). The ability to 
attain information dominance over an adversary gives a 
commander almost complete control over the information 
environment. It is an advantage that may be a better 
measure for victory than a measurement of brute force or 
firepower. 
The extensive use of modern information systems and 
technologies during modern conflicts and operations, such 
as the Global War on Terror and the Gulf Wars, has led 
these conflicts to be labeled as the information wars, but 
calling them information wars does not imply that they are 
the first conflicts where information was use. Using 
information in warfare is not a new concept, but the 
developments of information technologies greatly affects 
the way war is fought (Poisel, 2004). The capabilities of 
modern war ships are an example of information systems that 
change the way wars are fought. The ability to network 
information gathered from a fleet of ships into one common 
operating picture gives ship commanders an edge over their 
adversaries through enabling him or her to make decisions 
faster with information not available to the opposing 
force. Ship commanders, enabled with modern technology, 
need to understand how the information systems they command 
operate across multiple domains and the vulnerabilities 
they are exposed to through the reliance on those 
technologies. Such vulnerability is inherent in complex  
 
 55
systems, but the benefits are of such value that accepting 
some risk of disruption while taking action to reduce 
vulnerability is warranted. 
With the Navy’s increasing role in information 
dominance there needs to be clearer instruction or doctrine 
on how to view and employ its surface combatants in that 
capacity. How will commanders understand the missions they 
may be tasked to accomplish regarding information dominance 
without clear guidance? Commanders act on what they know. 
The quality of what they know is based on previous 
experience, the information they are given, and the 
fidelity of the information environment. 
The Navy needs to emphasize the importance of 
understanding information and its effect on human behavior. 
This understanding comes from training and education that 
incorporates the psychology of information; an education 
that is not centered on just the technology that is used to 
collect and interpret information. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
An aspect of the information explosion that has a 
tremendous impact on the Navy’s war fighting and 
humanitarian operations is the omnipresent nature of social 
media such as Facebook, Twitter, and blogs. Understanding 
how the change in information flow and availability caused 
by social media outlets impacts human behavior and will 
have meaningful consequences for military decision making. 
Military activities that were once isolated and difficult 
to observe are now exposed and broadcast instantaneously 
around the world. Social media and the abundance of 
portable, very sophisticated computers allow information to 
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reach the far corners of the earth at near real-time 
(Macke, 2013). Knowledge of what is happening in military 
events is no longer reserved information for political 
elites and military commanders. If people have the ability 
to make a connection to cyberspace, they have the 
opportunity to know anything about what is going on in the 
world. This access complicates the application of friendly 
command and control, increases an enemy’s knowledge of 
events, and possibly enables them to execute more effective 
actions and reactions (Macke, 2013). Commanders need to 
understand how the use of social media and increased access 
to information outlets affects their ability to interrupt 
an enemy’s C2 and decision cycles. 
Information is not only a powerful concept when used 
to make command decisions, but its critical role in society 
raises wider ethical issues: who owns information? Who 
controls its dissemination? Who has access to information 
(Floridi, 2010)? Further research into this area could 
explore how information can legally be controlled and how 
the increasing capability to access information may 
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